But
At some point, I think we need a rigorous exploration of Žižekian logic, with it’s central connective “but,” that is, arguments of the form “P, but is it not in fact the case that not P.” An example that occoured to me today was, “It is generally claimed that America is excessively religious, but is it not in fact the case that America is not religious enough.” Look at creationism: the problem is not the religiousity of belief in creation, but the scientism of thinking that Genesis is literally, scientifically, true. This is a problem with evangelical Christianity more generally: the reduction of a narrative tradition that posits a complex relation between speech and reality (analogy, metaphor, metonymy) to truth-functional assertions. It’s bad theology. Far from being excessively religious, fundamentalist Christians do not even know what religion is. There are few things to like about the Catholic church or the current Pope, but the fact that he, like his predecessors, has a training in philosophy reminds us that historically the church has taken reasoned argument seriously (compare Pat Robertson, who says that his time at university “centered around lovely young ladies who attended the nearby girls schools”). Catholicism, being commited to the compatability of scripture and reason, is aware that evolutionary theory is not simply incompatible with religion.
This is analogous to a point I’ve made before about conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories which posit a driving force behind the supposed seats of power are a narrative form of making a point which is entirely correct (this driving force being capitalism as a system). The problem comes when this narrative is read not as a metaphor which reveals a structure present in capitalism, but as a descriptive account which is directly, factually true; conspiracy theorists becomeobsessed with finding evidence, no matter how spurious and unconvincing. See, for instance, this wild empiricism disguised as science (as Badiou said in a different context), which is completely typical of 9/11 conspiracy theories. A barrage of facts, unconnected or sometimes mutually contradictory, are not patiently assembled into a theory which could challenge the official account of 9/11. Instead, unexplained facts are haphazardly amassed in the hope that the sheer weight will force a resolution in terms of “conspiracy.” The argument from ignorance here is the same one that supports Intelligent Design.
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But, to take up a side point, the problem with conspiracy theories is that, even in their metaphorical dimension, they are deeply problematic. First, they express a cynicism about power and politics - that our fates our more or less beyond our control. Second, they re-represent market forces as some hidden agency determining our fate, rather than as the absence of a socialized, collective agency. This radically miscontrues the capitalist order. It not that there really is a hidden hand determining our fate, to be represented in conspiracy theories. It is that capitalist social relations are disorganized, uncontrolled, and irrational. Nobody is in control. I see little virtue, then, in even the metaphorical or connotative aspects of conspiracy theories, which instead of exposing the inner laws of capitalism so that we may exercise real collective control over our society, fatalistically represent capitalist chaos as a hidden but supreme power.
Comment by Alex Gourevitch @ 1/28/2006 8:44 am
I’ve always argued against people, liberals and conservatives mostly, who call Chomsky and his acolytes conspiricists. But after reading this post, I can see where they have a point. Chomsky’s refusal of theory and method of marshalling mountains of empirical data is the “barrage of facts haphazardly amassed” that you talk about. Without a theory of power, it feels like conspiracy.
I like your point about Zizek’s conjunction. “But” is the conjunction of dialectics, no? Maybe that’s why I favor Deleuze’s conjunctions: and, or, so.
Comment by Eric @ 1/28/2006 3:57 pm
While I certainly agree with your interest with a more complex development of Zizek’s logic, I wonder if the conspiracy theory isn’t a misguided but genuine attempt to develop a broad-based distrust of authority and form of political consciousness. While I completely agree with Alex’s assessment epically in relation to the cynicism and hidden agency, I think I am more comfortable with a cacophony than the alternative.
“A barrage of facts, unconnected or sometimes mutually contradictory, are not patiently assembled into a theory which could challenge the official account”
Aren’t we treading back towards a party line with this direction of thought? Doesn’t such an approach get us back to a place that the cacophony is trying to avoid? While I think both approaches produce different politics, there have been consistent academic efforts in the field of International Political Economy in Canada and the UK to develop these consistently argued and well developed theories of contemporary capitalism. Unfortunately they have the result of producing very divisive academic followings with little to no connection to political movements and tactics. I don’t know if this just means we need more organic intellectuals, but I am wary of oversimplification of complexity involved in such theories that could provide a clear challenge to the official account.
Comment by Dan @ 1/28/2006 8:11 pm
hey tim!
what do you know about lacan’s “objet a”? I believe there is a capitalist argument about it, but right now i’ll settle for anything you’ve got. thanks bud!
Comment by leila @ 1/29/2006 2:04 pm